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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

(Zivilantsgerichtin Prague, 1927, 2 Zeitschrift fuer das gesamrnte Luftrecht, 56)
Finally the Reichsgericht in another opinion has said that it would
be beyond reason if after the full development of air navigation the general public were dependent on the use of such navigation to allow the
air companies to misuse their monopoly and the situation of the public
to force passengers to waive the protection which the statute gives them.
(46 Eisenbahn und Verkehrsrecht Entscheidungen, und Abhandlungen,
93, affirmed 1 Zeitschrift fuer das gesamrnte Lwftrecht, 296.)
PROFESSOR CARL ZOLLMAN

Carriers: Valuation of: Rate Making
The importance of the question decided in St. Louis and O'FallonRy.
Co., et al v. United States, et a1,1 and United States, et al v. St. Louis and
O'FallonRy. Co., et al, 2 made it one of general interest when the decision
was announced last May. The question involved in brief was this:
How should the value of railroads be determined so that a fair return
might be had on the capital invested? The answer to this question is
one which affects the inhabitants of the United States individually, either
as users of the railroads or as investors.
The "Transportation Act of 1920 "1 provided that the Interstate Commerce Commission should have authority to fix a reasonable uniform
rate for railroads in various districts so that a return of 6 per cent might
be had on the capital invested in property "held for and used in the service of transportation" as a fair return upon such investment. It was
further provided that "if, under the provisions of this section, any carcier receives for any year a net railway operating income in excess of
6 per cent of the value of the railway property held for and used by it
in the service of transportation, one-half of such excess shall be placed
in a reserve fund established and maintained by such carrier and the
remaining one-half shall be.

..

. paid to the Commission for the pur-

pose of establishing and maintaining a general railroad contingent fund."
In other words, the Commission is authorized to set 6 per cent as a
maximum return on the amount of money invested in railroads. Realizing that in some sections of the country the stronger roads would, under
the uniform rates established by the commission, earn more than 6 per
cent on their invested capital; the Transportation Act further provided
that a fund should be established out of the surplus earnings of these
roads to aid the weaker roads of the same district.
'49 U.S.C.A. No. 15a.

249

Sup. Ct. Rep. 384.
'73 L.ed. 457.

NOTES AND COMMENT

The plaintiff railroad in this case was ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to place in a reserve fund, one-half of its excess
income for the years 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923. The St. Louis and
O'Fallon Railway Company and The Manufacturers' Railway were asserted to be parts of the same system by the plaintiff, and further that
the Manufacturers' Railway had earned no excess operating income.
The Commission found that the two railroads had the same principal
officers and stockholders, but that they were separated at their closest
point by twelve miles, and hence were not parts of the same system.
The Supreme Court agreed with this finding of the Railroad Commission.
The principal dispute in this case, however, occurred over the manner
of valuing the O'Fallon road in determining the amount of excess income which it had earned. The Transportation Act, as passed by Congress, declared that the Commission should "give due consideration to
all the elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes." "The elements of value recognized by the law of the
land fo r rate-making purposes have been pointed out many times by this
court," says Justice McReynolds, who wrote the opinion of the court.
"Among them is the present cost of construction or reproduction." On
this point a list of cases were cited, chief among these being Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466. The report of the minority of the Commission
shows that the Commission failed to consider .the present reproduction
costs in determining the value of the O'Fallon road. The Commission
did consider the present value of the real estate, but for units installed
prior to 1914, which constituted the major part of the carrier's property,
allowed only the 1914 valuation, and gave no consideration to the cost
of this property in 1923, nor to the increase in value since 1914.
The Supreme Court, by a six to three decision, held that in this respect the Commission erred. The court declared that "Congress has
directed that values shall be fixed upon a consideration of present costs
along with all other pertinent facts; and this mandate must be obeyed."
Justice Brandeis wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion in which Justice
Holmes and Stone concurred. The decision has been criticized by laymen and economists as one based upon arbitrary legal principles, and a
disregard of sound economic facts. Valuing railroads at their present
cost of reproduction increases their values so enormously that transportation rates could be correspondingly increased and still remain within
the authorized 6 per cent rethrn on the invested capital.
But, as Justice McReynolds points out, the function of the Interstate
Commerce Commission was correctly stated in the minority report of
that commission in the present case, in these words: "The function of
this commission is not to act as an arbiter in economics, but as an agency
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of Congress, to apply the law of the land to facts developed of record in
matters committed by Congress to our jurisdiction."
T. W. HAYDEN
Courts: Attorney and Client
State v. Cannon.1
This was an action to disbar from the practice of law, the defendant,
Raymond J. Cannon. The original action against Cannon was begun
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court by the State Bar Commissioners, May
10, 1928, pursuant to the provisions of section 25628 of the Statutes of
1927.
The Honorable E. C. Fiedler was referred to the case, and it was
he who took the testimony and reported the fact. He recommended that
Cannon be suspended from practice for two years, and that he be required to pay the expenses and costs of the action. The defendant was
disclosed by the record as a man whose purpose it was to let nothing
stand in the way of making his profession yield him the largest possible
financial return, without regard to the established canons of professional
conduct. To accomplish that end, the referee foudd that he began the
Huelse suit without authority from the injured man; that he improperly
displaced attorneys previously retained; that he purposely and knowingly
misled and deceived courts; that he collected excessive, exorbitant, and
unconscionable fees from his clients; and that he commercialized his
profession by the organized solicitation of business.
Because of the severe penalty imposed upon Cannon for his "ambulance chasing" proclivities, the case should command the attention
of the entire Wisconsin bar, because its interests are at stake. In fact,
Justice Crownhart in his dissenting opinion said: "If attorneys may be
subjected to such inquisitions and ruthless charges in the future, we may
expect a weak and spineless bar-one that will be afraid to fight the
battles of the poor and humble as they ought to be fought to secure
justice."
The question of the powers of the courts to disbar attorneys was
an important one. This case is not the first one in which the unethical
conduct of attorneys has been criticized. The power to protect courts
and the public from the official ministration of persons unfit for practice
in them was fully established in the former decision of the court in this
case, State v. Cannon,2 where it was held that, when the people by means
of the Constitution established courts, they became endowed with all
judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial functions delegated
to them.
'226 N.W. 385; Wis.
'196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603.

